Resumption of negotiations on the Common Fund. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (78) 496 final, 29 September 1978 by unknown
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
COM(78) 496 final 
Brussels, 29 September 1978 
RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE COMMON FUND 
(Communication from the Commission to the Council) 
COM(78) 496 final -2-
I.  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  NEGOTIATioNS 
1.  Th~ purpose  of this communication is  :;o  :et  ou.t  the lines of a  .Communi~y 
position for the  Common  Fu:hd  negotiating  coufere~1oe ;'i1i~h  seems  lik~ly to 
.  . 
resume  in the late autumn.  In the  JJNCTAD  calenda·.;.· of ·.neetings,  the period of 
13th .to  3oth November  has  been ·provtsionally. set  as:i.d.e; 
2.  North/south  di~iogue,  Integrated Progra!Pffie  f.or  Com_£di.ties,  Common  Fund. 
Together with the· individual comri19dities  on the  UNCTAD  ~ist  (1),  the  Common· 
Fu.rid  is c;me  of the.main pillars of· the. Integrated Pr~gramm~ and there ·.is a 
fundamental  +inic  between the· 'negotiat:i.6ns .  concernii1g each (2).  ·By.  ~he 
'  ~ 
same  token  progr.ess achieved on both sides would be. mutually reinforcing.  In 
the ·.same  way,  the negotiat·ions  on the  COllll)lOn  _Fund.  as well as  on individual 
commodHies  are  likely. to bear directly_ on the  bro~er north/south debates 
which are continUing in the United Nations  Committee  of t.he  Whole,  at the 
· 33rd session of the United Nations  Generai ill!sembly,  and at  UNGTAD  V  (W~a.nila, 
.  I  .  . 
May  1979). 
3.  Ind..i. vidual comniodi ties.  The  real but.- lind.  t.ed progress achfeved on these 
suggests ;,that the economic basis. of the Fund  ~s likely  ~o be narrower than 
orig:i.nally envisaged in the list of 18 '(including  ~0 key)  commodities  (1) •. · 
(1) 
(2) 
.. 
Of the fh•e existing international collli!l'odity  agreements  (ICAs)  (3), 
there are  tw~  (tin~  cocoa) ·which· contain stocking provisions,  and 
one  ·c coffee) within which a  study 0(1DCerning an eventual stock has 
been put  in l)and. 
T~·n "key"  CC>llUllO.di·tj.es  r]eemed  ll.Y"  :the  UNCTAD  to be  stook:cble  ·  -~  cbcoa, 
coffee~  copper»  cotton yarns, .hard fibres/products.,  jute/products,  rubb<:•'='r 
sugar,  tea~  tin;  g1~  ~nc,.nant  ba•tt·ite,  :i.ron.  ore-:  manganese,  mGat: 
phosphatesv  timberf  vegetable oils·...  · 
See  COM(78)22  f':i.nal 1  paragraph J.l)o 
(j)  Tin,  ~oct>a.r.  qof.·feef  sug;c,:r~  l.Jl:i.v.;  o:tJ.;  i.e<·  nl)t  in.cJv..ding  vthe2·j: 1 ,  ·rrhich 
does  ?lOt  faa:tu.re  on· tbe  Irrteg-L'e:liecl  P:rogr-euune,, -3-
Of  the remaining 13  commodities ·on  the list; internationally 
financed stocks might  be  realised fer a  fe~r  commodiHe~ (rubbert  jute, 
hard fibres).  Measures  other than stocks requiring international 
finance might  be agreed in respect  of some  more  commodities. 
On  the basis of this hypothesis it seems  likely that, in the mediuni-term 
future,  the maximum' financial needs  of the  Commdn  Fund lllaJ"  be in the region 
of~ l/1-ft billion (including certain contributions for other measU.res  (1)). 
4.  Cominon  Fund.  In the meantime  UNCTAD's  Intergovernmental  Committee  for 
the Integrated Progra.imn.e  (2)  has invited the UNCTAD  Secretary-General to. 
decide  on  the date and duration of the resumption of negotiations  on  the 
Common  Fund: 
"in the light  of his assessment  (Jf  developments. and prospect.s arising 
from  previous and further consultations  ••• taking  int~ account the 
provision made  in the  calendar of meetings  •••"• 
Further consultations are :heeded in addition to those conducted so far by the 
UNCTAD  Secretary-General,  since these have indicated a  certain n~ber of 
difficulties which it has  not  so far proved possible to resolve,  touching on 
the functions,  modes  of operation,  an~ structure of the Fund.  If the 
Conference is resumed with a  reasonable chance  of success, ·it is essential 
that  every effort should be made  to overcome  these difficulties. 
4.1  Aga~nst this  bac~·ound, the Community  should now  complete the work  of 
which the  Councils  of 7th February  an~ 7th March  took note  (3} directed 
towards  the  establishmen·~ of  a.  common  poeii tion:  it should be  recalled that 
. (1)  This hypothesis may  be  comP.areuwith the  round~ 6 billion estimated by 
the  UNCTAD  Secretariat for stocks  for  ·~he  10 "kay"  oornmodi ties and for 
measures  other than stocld.ng required for the  18  commodities  (see page  21 
footnote  (l)).  .  -
(2)  At  its sixth session,  Geneva,  loth~ 15th Ju~, .1978. 
(3)  T/115/78  Extra 1 and R/104/78. the European  Council at. Bremen· resolved th&t  t;.1e  Common:  Ffund  negotia:tions  .. 
should.be followed up with a  view to·bringir•g th€m to a  positive.' conclusion·(!)  .  .  ,)  .  .  .  . 
and t'hat the Bonn  Summit  broadly endorsed' this  cal~.  'l'he  Community must 
.  ..  .,  .  .  . 
the:iefore now ·define a  common  position on all the  outstar:td:l.ng major poin,ts tn 
....  "" 
a  wa:y  that will offer a  ·reasonable basis for success  :i_n  negotiations. 
II.  THE  MAJOR  POINTS  AT  ISSUE 
5·  The  Commission bas  alre~  propose~ a  fiv~point pacll=age  (2)  o,; which 
preliminary  d:i.scus~io,;s  have  been held (3):  the  Commllllity  must  now  fix i·~s · 
·position on the niain elements - functions,  financial structure,  and llla.ila.gement  ~ 
of tlie Fund,  in the form  of aq overall package.  This overall  pac~e might 
usefully be  expressed in,te~s of~ framework agreement  which would.allow the 
Ftmd to evolve progressively over time as new  ICAs  deciding to associ_ate.with' 
it are signed (4). 
6 •  Functions.  There is broad agreement between all mig~tiating parties 
that the  Common  Fund should facilitate the establishment· of'  new. ICAs  particul~rlY 
those  coverin(5 COmmC)dities  of special interest to  deve~oping COlll'ltrieS  .(5). 
The  operational functions  suggested for-. it .fall llllder the three heads  of 
.stocking,  measures  oth/er than stocks  r~quiring ~inance 1  and actions  outside 
ICAs. 
'  (1) 
.S~ocking:  all agree' that the·Fund's main purpose is to ensure the 
financing of international buffer stocks_. 
Conclusions  of the  European  Co~cil at  Br~men, qth/7th July, _1978  ~ Extract: 
. "Les negociations act'uellement  en cours  aU:' sujet. d 'un  Fond~ c~~un et 'de . 
. la conclusion de  Clifferents accords  de  p:rodui ts devront  etre pourf:!ui vies 
-en  vue  de  parvenir,a des  r~sultats positifs. · Il conviendrait  d'examiner 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
.  (5) 
dans  ce contexte ·la question de  la.  stabili~ation ·des recett.es  d  ~ exportati·on11 • 
See  COM{78 )22  final,  Seqtj,on II. 
See  I/48/78(DIAL  3)  and I/98/78(DIAL  11). 
See  COM(77 )365  final,  Part VIII: 
Tert  drawn  from the Group  B proposal of 7th liovemberr  19']7 
TD/IPC/CONF.Lo5• -s-
other measures:  the developing countries have insisted that the 
Fund  should be  charged with the  financing~ within ICAs 9  of measures 
other than  b~lf~er stocks.  · 1 
Extra  ICA  measures.  The  developi1~ countries have also proposed that. 
the Fund.should- "at the request  of developing producer col:mtries"-
finance  emergency stocking and other measures  outside ICAs. 
It is important  for the  Community  to take a  cle~r ·stand on  these pointe. 
6.1  Stocks.  The  Community  must  continue to insist that the F\md's main role 
should be to facilitate the financing of internationc:-lly fJ,.nanced  st9cks, 
whether internationally or nationally held,  in a  reliable economici 
equitable and viable manner. 
6.2  other measures.  On  these the  Commission would recall the recommendation 
which it has  made  that  a  role for the Fund in this area should be 
acqepted "provided that it is carefully defined with reference to the 
actual or likely needs  of commodities and ·to the role played by other 
• 
. agencies  in meeting them"  (1).  Bearing in mind the definitions already 
put  forward by the  Commission  Services  (2)1  the Ftlnd's  rol~ should be 
limited to measures,  which are dire0ted towards the objective of market 
stabilisation,  agreed within  ICAs  (see follm·l'ing point) 
which  en-ter into an_.appropriate  form. of association (e.g.  exchange  of 
letters) with the  Common  Fund. 
·~  . 
.  The  concept ·of the Fund having a  role outside I CAs  should not. be accepted 
for the following reasons: 
measures  ca.riDot  by definition be held to represent the interests 
of producers and  consumers at large unless agreed b~tween them; 
the  Common  Fund should not  be given  a-f~ction which would carry 
with it the serious risk of overlapping facilities already 
provided or which Illa\Y  in the future be provided by the IMF. 
(1)  See  COM(78)22  final,  Paragraph 5· 
(2)  See  I/98/78(DIAL 11),  Annex  1. The  touchstone for  Common  Fund :action _T.,c:t  always· be tr..a:l;  it takes place • 
in the· context  of the. joint agreement  of  i/Y.'~'\<.<eers  and· consumers -. 
representing the major part  of the trade  i~ the  Gommodi ty concerned: 
.  .  .  .  . 
to what  extent this  cl:gr~em~nt  could: be.  e:X:prer:sec~ · .',n  less· rather t{lan 
more  formal  arrallt?;ements 'is.a matter for negotic;:'aonQ 
7.  Financial structure/modes of financing.  Lea{rF·t=.·  pc;ssible earnings  on  one 
.  .  .  .  . 
side, four modes  of financing have been suggested by  d.:i.fferent  parlies. to_  the 
negotiations,  of which  only the last two.  apply to other. measures as well as 
b'!lf'fer at  ocks:. 
- ' 
cash deposit  a  by  partl~ipat-ing: I CAs; 
- borrowing on internatiO'llcil markets  on the basis of approp.riate, 
guarantees; 
I 
voluntary contributions; • 
assessed capital contributions  from Fund  JI~embers. 
.  . 
Before  examining these in turn,· it should be underlined that  the· Fund's  overall 
financial  obligations, 'including its borrowing,.  must  in no  circumstances  e~ceed 
.  . 
t~e aggregat,e  of the obligations undertaken by consumers  and producers within 
part~cipating !CAs.  On  the basis of the  hypo~hesis adVa.nced ;n: paragraph  3, 
I  <.  ''"  ' 
'this would indicate a  ceiling, of .¢' l;/lt billion;  such a  figure migh:t,  however, 
well increase as  fUrther  ICAs  join  • 
. 
7.1  First  (buffer stoold.ng) window.  Here  the  Commission believes that ·rcA· 
'.  .  .. ',  . 
deposits represent the best way  of ensuring the availability of·cash 
.·pari passu with need (i.e. as  !cAs'  join).  It_ must,  however,.be recognised 
'that the developing  (and some  developed countries) attach great 
.  ~  . 
im~ortance to the notion _of  som~ resources being.subscribed'directly by 
the members.  of the Fund;  :the. Comrlri.ssion  takes the view that this  demand. 
can and should be accommodated within the· broad approac4 already put 
forward by the  industriali~ed countries.  Its views  on the  vario1w  modes 
of financing is, therefore;  as follows: (1) 
(2) 
ICA  depositst  33%  represent  a  reasonable contribution to ask 
I CAs  t·o  make.  If the  demand  is pitched as high as the  75% 
currently proposed,  the Fund will find it ha.:rd  to facilitate 
new  ICAs  or even to persuade existing ones  to  join~  Too  low 
a  percentage  on  the other hand would not  provide a  sufficient 
cash basis. 
Borrowingt  as long as  the guarantees provided are sufficiently 
firm,  there is ~o reason why  t~ey should not  ensure a  borrowing 
capacity s'\lffioient to oover-.two-thirds  of tot~l needs. 
Guarantees  provided by  ICA  members  through ICAs  wouLd  be  likely 
to be  sounder than the direct guarantees by FUnd  members  proposed 
by the Group  of 77.  However  an element  ()f  direct guarantees 
might  also be  requir~d (1). 
Voluntary contributions:  any such contributions made  to the first 
window  could be used for the same  purposes as direot assessed 
contributions .(see below):  bu.t  they should not  carry voting 
righ~s  (se~ paragraph a·.2). 
Assessed capital contributions from Fund members.  A relatively 
small  element  of direct  contr~butions could and should now  be 
envisaged  (2)~  The  capital resources/ so provided could be 
utilised to make  loans to IC.As ·for buffer stock pm'chases, 
especially in the early period of an ICA's participation. · The 
interest earned  (~hether by  loans to lCAs  'or other investments)' 
See  ~OM(78)22 final,  Paragraph 4·(iii). 
The  figure  of lo%  might  be alpropriate:  on  the basis of the hypothesis 
given in paragraph  3  (iDe.  ~ 900 million to ~ 1.4 billion for ~tocking 
purposes) this  ~ould mean  between~ 90 million and% 140 million, 
divided between all Fund meinber  countries according to a  key to be 
agreed, mig}?.t  be  used.to effect a  small inte?='est-rate  subsidy  (1)  on  .. 
loans made  to  ICAs  pr~vided that. this  ca.ri  be  done  on· a  non-
discriminatory basis. 
7.2  Second wil1dow..  The  financin&' of this' window  should. 'be  entirely  sep~rate 
·from the financing of the first;  ita str,ucture and modes  of  oper~tion 
should be defined as. follows:' 
the F\md•s activities .should ,normally ·cake  the  f~rm  ·of loans 
\' 
(on terms  adapted to International ~  for  Reconstru~tion ahd 
Development. (IBRP)/Iilternationa.l  Dav~lopment Association  (IDA) 
,  .. 
norms  wh~ch contribute  on a  oo-finanoing basis to overall 
project expenses;· 
contributions  should be  on a  voluntary ~asia.  The  Community 
·should, in principia,  be  prepared t·o  contribute and should be 
prepared to make  an a.nhouncementto this effect, if it·transpii.res 
that this would be a  significant fact or in' securing agreement  on 
an overall· Common ·Fund . package. 
8..  Admini'stration/votes.  The  Fund must  be structured in a  -way· that it wi~l 
provide f.or professional competence and, ensure .t.hat it does not  beconie  a 
highly politicised instrument  po0trolled by one  gr9.up  of-countries or by 
o6untrie~ with no  serious interest. in. comn1odity  trade~  The  Commurri,1;y  should; 
.  .  .  .  ·. 
therefore, . now  adopt the  ~ollowing guidelines in this area concerning overall 
structure and voting systems. 
8.1 ·  Overall structwe.  The  membership  of the Fund should be  ope.n  to: 
·countries members  of  ICAs  pa.ry_icipating 'in the first ¥J.d/or 
~econd window's  which  should· be  admitted automatically; 
(1)  Of  one to two percent. -~-
all other countries wishing to  join which are prepared to 
contribute to the Fund's assessed capital, according to the  key 
to be  a~eed; 
the  Community,  as  such,  bearing in mind the dispositions already 
made  within ICAs  and the  importance  of all commodity negotiations and 
.  .  . 
institutions,  in particular to  the~Community Common  Coniinercial-Policy. 
.  .  .  .  '  . 
Clear rules should be established within the FUnd's  Statutes governing the 
operation of the first &1d  second windows,  guaranteeing as far as possible 
the automaticity of the first and the  everi-handedness towards its ICA 
clients of the second.  A three -tier structure should be  envisaged with 
.  ' 
an Asf3embly  open- to.all members  (with relevant  IF!s as.  observers),  with  · 
a  relatively small Board of Governors,  selected on  the basis of 
"constituencies"  e~suring adequate  consumer as we.ll  as  producer 
representation,  and with a  small highly. professional staff.  An  Advisory 
Council through which  I CAs  as such  (see below) and IFis might make  their 
specialist  views  ~own might  also be  considered. 
8.2  Votes.  The  voting systems  applicable to decisions affecting the first and 
second windows  sh.ould - mutatis mutandis  reflect the financial basis of 
/ 
e~ch, as qualified 'by  an  element  of global votes consistent with 
established international norms. 
Votes in the first window  should thus reflect the contributions 
made  by  ICAs  to· the Fund's  cash resources and direct assessed 
contributions finally agreed which  should provide the. basis for 
_calculating the  element  of global votes.  Voluntary  contribut~ons 
(if any)  should not  carry voting rights. - Votes in the secohd window  should be based on  the voluntary 
financial  contributions made;  t_he  element  of .global votes 
allowed to non-contributory .members  shoul'd be  compatible with  ~hat . 
~greed for the first window  and snou_ld net  be decisive  •.. 
Appropriate  blocki~ mechanisms  should be  introduced for the first and 
for the second window,  des'igned to protect the  inter~sts of all gro;ups 
of countries.  In· the first window this migh·t  take the 
'form of requiring simple or qualified majorities of each of the two -ma.in 
"colleges", (i.e.  of  cons~er and of.  produce~-niembers) _or  of:  the overall 
membership.  In the second window  a.  simple  or  q~lified majority of the 
votes  of·financially contributing coWltries would be appropriate.·. 
8.3  On the  ba~is of the ·guidelines set  o~t above  (in paragr~phs 8.1 and 8.2). 
-the  Common  Fund -would. lia.ve  ~ single administrative struc.ture to express 
its colleotive persona.l:i..,ty  and  sep~ate voting systems  to'· reflect the 
.•  . 
different struct'lires  of j, ts two  operational .arms  (fi~st ·and second · 
windows).  The  Community  a.s  such should have the right to cast the votes 
of its Members,  where  the matters  t.o  be  decided fall .within the' 
Community's  competence. 